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NOTES AND COMMENTS
UNITED STATES v. SALERNO: DETAINING
DANGEROUS DEFENDANTS
I. INTRODUCTION
American law has traditionally recognized the strong liberty interest
of the individual by granting a defendant charged with a noncapital
crime the right to be free from incarceration while awaiting trial.' This
freedom, however, may be conditioned on the posting of bail to deter the
ffight of the accused.2 Denial of bail has been justified primarily by the
need to assure the defendant's appearance at trial.3 The bail system rec-
onciles the pretrial liberty interest of the individual with the govern-
ment's interest in insuring the operation of the criminal justice system.
The Bail Reform Act of 19844 significantly altered the traditional
purpose of bail by allowing a judicial officer to consider dangerousness as
a factor when determining whether to grant bail.' The Act authorizes a
court to order detention prior to trial to protect the community from
crimes which the defendant might commit if released.' These provisions
apply to "arrestees charged with serious felonies who are found after an
adversary hearing to pose a threat to the safety of ... the community
which no condition of release can dispel."7 This legislation permits pre-
ventive detention by restricting the liberty of defendants who endanger
society.
In a constitutional challenge to the Bail Reform Act of 1984, the
Supreme Court confirmed the validity of preventive detention in United




4. Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-
3150 (Supp. III 1985)).
5. Id. at § 3142(g). "The judicial officer shall... take into account.., the nature and serious-
ness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person's release." Id.
6. Id. at § 3142(f).
7. United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2105 (1987) [hereinafter Salerno 111].
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States v. Salerno.' In the opinion of the Court, the Act does not inflict
punishment prior to an adjudication of guilt and, therefore, does not vio-
late the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 9 Moreover, the Court
rejected the argument that denial of bail constitutes infinite bail in viola-
tion of the excessive bail clause of the eighth amendment."t The Court
found the pretrial detention provisions of the Act to be a carefully lim-
ited exception to individual liberty required by the government's concern
for the safety and lives of its citizens."1
The Salerno decision invites continued challenge to the Act because
it did not address the limitations to the length of pretrial detention. The
Court relied in part on the provisions of the Act which restrict the period
of detention to determine that preventive detention was not punitive. 12
The opinion, however, did not address the failure of these provisions to
protect a defendant from an unconstitutionally long period of pretrial
detention. By declining to establish parameters for determining when
due process requires release from detention, the decision leaves in place a
variety of practices and criteria developed by the federal courts to deter-
mine when the Act has been applied unconstitutionally.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
On March 20, 1986, Anthony Salerno was indicted for racketeering
activity.13 The indictment charged that Salerno was the current "Boss"
of the Genovese Organized Crime Family and controlled the use of the
family's violence. 4 The thrust of the twenty-nine count indictments was
8. 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987). The defendant's initial detention hearing was reported at United
States v. Salerno, 631 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) [hereinafter Salerno 1]. The appeal from that
order to detain was reported at United States v. Salerno, 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1986) [hereinafter
Salerno I1].
9. Salerno III, 107 S. Ct. at 2102-04.
10. Id. at 2104.
11. Id. at 2105.
12. Id. at 2101.
13. Salerno I, 631 F. Supp. 1364, 1366 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The indictment was filed on March
20, 1986 and unsealed on March 21, 1986. Id. The indictment came over a year after Salerno had
been indicted on similar charges in the "Commission" case. In that case, Salerno and twenty-four
others were named in a seventy-one count indictment on charges of committing "state and federal
crimes, including murder, robbery, narcotics violations, arson, extortion, threats, asaults, illegal
gambling, bribery, interstate theft and transportation of stolen goods, extortion and mail/wire
fraud." United States v. Colombo, 777 F.2d 96, 97 (2d Cir. 1985). Salerno was released, but Co-
lombo was detained pursuant to the Bail Reform Act. Id. at 101.
14. Salerno I, 631 F. Supp. at 1366. The purposes of the Family included the unlawful infiltra-
tion of the concrete construction, food manufacturing, and food distribution industries; murder and
conspiracies to murder those who threatened the Family or its activities; creating fear of the Family
[Vol. 23:429
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that the power and effectiveness of the Genovese Family to carry out its
criminal activities depended on "its ability and willingness to use
violence." 15
At Salerno's arraignment, the government urged that he be denied
bail, 6 as required by the Bail Reform Act of 1984, on the grounds that
no condition of bail or combination of release conditions would assure
the safety of the community. 17 The government charged that Salerno
was dangerous and would continue to engage in racketeering activities if
released. 8 Evidence, including statements concerning prospective
testimony,19 a weapon found in Salerno's home,20 and excerpts from elec-
tronic surveillance, supported the government's charges.2
Salerno was unable to rebut the government's evidence that he
presented a danger to the community.22 He argued that the proposed
through violence; and concealment of the Family from law enforcement officials. Id. Details were
given of each Family member's role in the racketeering activities of "bid rigging in the concrete
construction industry, extortion, loansharking, labor racketeering, gambling and the use of vio-
lence." Id.
15. Id. at 1367. The charges included two conspiracies to commit murder; violations of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982); mail fraud,
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982); wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343 (1982); extortion, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982); and
operating illegal bookmaking and numbers businesses, 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1982). Id. at 1366-67.
The prosecution supported its charges with prospective testimony from two "former high-
ranking members of organized crime." Salerno II, 794 F.2d 64, 66-67 (2d Cir. 1986). The witnesses
had testified previously in other organized crime trials. Salerno I, 631 F. Supp. at 1367. The antici-
pated testimony was the primary support for the conspiracy to murder charges. The witnesses alleg-
edly participated in conversations with Salerno which resulted in hit orders. Id. at 1367-68.
Electronic surveillance was used in two Manhatten social clubs, from which the Genovese Fam-
ily conducted its business, and one location in a construction trailer in Edgewater, New Jersey. Id.
at 1367. The evidence supported labor violence charges, including the beatings of members of a local
carpenter's union who opposed Family control, and loansharking violence, including the beatings of
slow payers. Id at 1368-69. This form of evidence also supported charges of gambling violence,
including threats of beatings for those who violated the "two block" rule by operating a numbers
business within two blocks of a Genovese Family numbers store. Id. at 1369. A lawful search of
Salerno's home netted a .25 caliber automatic weapon and ammunition. Id. at 1368.
16. Salerno II, 794 F.2d at 66.
17. Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).
18. Salerno I, 631 F. Supp. at 1371. "Mhe government has established that Salerno is the
head, or "Boss," of an organization engaged in extortion, loansharking, illegal gambling, and mur-
der." Id. "The government... urges strenuously that no condition of ball or combination of condi-
tions will assure the safety of the community .. " Id. at 1366.
19. Id. at 1371.
20. Id at 1372.
21. Id. at 1367.
22. Id. at 1370. At his detention hearing, Salerno argued initially that the government's motion
for detention should be denied because it was not made when he was indicted in the "Commission"
case. Id. at 1372. He charged that the government was aware of all the facts alleged in the current
indictment at the time of the previous indictment. Id The court found, however, that the "Com-
mission" indictment had not named Salerno in any specific conspiracy to murder. Id. Moreover,
the government witness whose testimony supported the murder conspiracy charges in the current
indictment had not come forward in the earlier case. Id. Salerno ultimately conceded that the
3
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government witnesses were impeachable because they were receiving a
favorable deal from the government concerning their past crimes in ex-
change for their testimony.2 3 Salerno also produced more than a dozen
character witnesses to testify that they did not consider him to be a
threat to the community.24 Moreover, Salerno proposed conditions of
bail that would restrict his movements and associations, leaving him vir-
tually under house arrest.25 He was, however, unable to offer evidence to
rebut the government's proof of "violent acts, conspiracies, and his posi-
tion as Boss of the Genovese Family."26 The government had estab-
lished by clear and convincing evidence that Salerno posed a present
threat to the community. Furthermore, the proposed conditions of re-
lease offered by Salerno were inadequate to diminish or control the dan-
ger to the community. 2 Thus, Salerno was confined to a corrections
facility to await his trial. 9
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals heard Salerno's appeal of the
detention order and argument that the Bail Reform Act of 1984 was un-
constitutional. 0 The court found that the Act violated the fifth amend-
ment guarantee of due process by permitting pretrial detention of a
government's failure to seek his detention earlier affected only the weight and credibility of the
government's evidence and did not bar the government from seeking detention under the new indict-
ment.' Id. Salerno argued alternatively that the government should have moved for detention when
the information regarding the murder conspiracies became available, and its failure to do so pre-
cluded the current motion. IM. The court pointed out that the Act barred such action in the previ-
ous case because the motion for detention must be made at the defendant's first appearance in a case.
Id. (construing the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)). The first appearance require-
ment, however, was satisfied in the current case. Id.
23. Id. at 1370.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1374.
26. Id at 1370.
27. Id. at 1366.
28. Id. at 1374.
29. Id. at 1375.
30. Salerno II, 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1986). Salerno also appealed statutory issues. Id. at 66.
The Act requires a detention order to "include written findings of fact and a written statement of the
reasons for the detention." Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i)(1). Section 3145 deals
with review of detention orders: subsection (b) allows the defendant to file a motion for revocation
of an order of detention and subsection (c) provides both the government and the defendant the right
to appellate review of a release or detention order or of an order denying revocation or amendment
of such an order. Id. at § 3145. Although the circuits are split on the appropriate standard of
review for an appeal, the Second Circuit refused to disturb the district court's decision unless it was
clearly erroneous. Salerno II, 794 F.2d at 70. The court found that the government's evidence was
sufficient to support the trial court's finding. Id. See generally, Serr, The Federal Bail Reform Act of
1984: The First Wave of Case Law, 39 ARK. L. REv. 169, 252-55 (1985).
Salerno also challenged the government's use of a recorded conversation in a construction
trailer in Edgewater, New Jersey that had been obtained through a court ordered electronic surveil-
lance. Salerno II, 794 F.2d at 69. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9) (1982) deals with the interception of wire
communications and requires that each party to a hearing be furnished with a copy of the court
4
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defendant on the ground that his release would pose a danger to the com-
munity.3' The Act's preventive detention provisions were found to be
"repugnant to the concept of substantive due process, which... prohib-
its the total deprivation of liberty simply as a means of preventing future
crimes. '"32 The court remanded the matter to the district court to set
conditions of bail.33 Because the decision created a conflict among the
circuits regarding the validity of the Act, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve the disparity.34
B. Issues
The issues for review were whether the Bail Reform Act of 1984
violated the fifth amendment due process clause3" or the eighth amend-
ment excessive bail clause.36 The Supreme Court upheld the preventive
detention authorized by the Act, finding that incarceration of dangerous
individuals pending trial violated neither the substantive or procedural
requirements of the fifth amendment37 nor the proscription of excessive
bail in the eighth amendment.38
III. LAW PRIOR TO THE CASE
A. The History of Preventive Detention
The concept of preventive detention is firmly rooted in Anglo-
order authorizing the interception and accompanying application at least ten days before the hear-
ing. The requirement is intended to provide the defendant an opportunity to make a pretrial motion
to suppress the evidence. Id. at 70. Salerno argued that the government's evidence should be re-
jected because he had not received the application and order ten days before the hearing. Id. at 69.
The court reasoned that Salerno had not been prejudiced by this delay because a pretrial motion to
suppress evidence could only be made by "an aggrieved person, .. . a person who was a party to any
intercepted wire or oral communication or a person against whom the interception was directed
.... I" d. at 70. Salerno did not fall in this category because he was neither named in the surveil-
lance order nor a party to the intercepted conversation. Id
31. Id. at 71.
32. Id. at 71-72.
33. Id. at 75. The court stayed its mandate pending the issuance of its mandate in United
States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1986). Melendez-Carrion had ordered reevalua-
tion of defendants detained pursuant to the Act on the basis that the length of detention violated the
defendants' rights to due process. Id. at 1004. The Meledez-Carrion mandate had been stayed to
allow the parties to appeal the significant issues raised by the case to the Supreme Court. Id. at 1005.
The mandate in Melendez-Carrion had not been issued when Salerno 11 was decided.
34. Salerno III, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2098 (1987).
35. Id. at 2100.
36. Id. at 2100-01.
37. Id. at 2104.
38. Id. at 2105.
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American jurisprudence.3 9 It arose in England during the reign of Ed-
ward III in response to the inability of the criminal justice system to
preserve peace.4° The judiciary had the power to require a bond, not
because of a crime committed, but because of a threat of future criminal
activity by an individual whose past convictions or general behavior pro-
vided probable cause to suspect future misconduct.4 ' Those who failed
to provide the bond were imprisoned.42
The peace bond was adopted in this country as part of the common
law heritage43 and is currently reflected in valid state statutory law.44
Although the circumstances in which a peace bond is applicable have
been narrowed, it continues to be used successfully to deal with minor
domestic and neighborhood complaints.45 The use of the bond has sur-
vived constitutional challenge on the basis that the proceedings are civil
in nature rather than criminal. 46 This clear identification of the civil na-
ture of the peace bond supports a similar civil characterization of the
practice of preventive detention as reflected in the Bail Reform Act of
1984.
The use of bail in the criminal justice system has figured signifi-
cantly in the evolving practice of preventive detention in this country.
Although bail was clearly established to be used as a deterrent to the
flight of an accused, 7 it frequently became used:
39. Note, As Time Goes By: Pretrial Incarceration Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984 and the
Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 8 CARnozo L. REv. 1055, 1076 n.100 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Pretrial
Incarceration]; Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1503 (1966) [here-
inafter Note, Preventive Detention]; Note, "Preventive Justice" - Bonds to Keep the Peace and for
Good Behavior, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 331, 332 (1940) [hereinafter Note, Preventive Justice].
40. Note, Preventive Justice, supra note 39, at 332.
41. Note, Pretrial Incarceration, supra note 39, at 1076 n.100.
42. Note, Preventive Justice, supra note 39, at 332; Note, Pretrial Incarceration, supra note 39,
at 1076 n.100.
43. Note, Preventive Detention, supra note 39, at 1503.
44. Note, Preventive Justice, supra note 39, at 332.
45. Note, Preventive Detention, supra note 39, at 1504.
46. Id. at 1503 n.102. The failure to clearly classify proceedings as civil has made the adminis-
tration of peace bond statutes difficult and has raised issues related to burden of proof, jurisdiction,
evidence, court costs, and territoriality. For example, the burden of proof on the complainant is
determined by the nature of the proceeding. Criminal proceedings require proof beyond a reason-
able doubt, while civil proceedings require only proof by a preponderance of the evidence. In declar-
ing the action civil, the courts have determined that the action is not one of punishment; and
therefore, the law should aid the party seeking to prevent crime. Note, Preventive Justice, supra note
39, at 333.
47. Hickey, supra note 1, at 287; Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Right to Bail: Histori-
cal Perspectives, 82 COLLJM. L. REv. 328, 329-30 (1982). [hereinafter Note, The Eighth Amend-
ment]; Note, Preventive Detention, supra note 39, at 1489; see Reynolds v. United States, 80 S. Ct. 30
(1959) (ensuring the defendant's appearance and submission to the court with the use of bail); Ex
pane Milburn, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 704, 710 (1835) (securing the attendance of the accused with bail); S.
[Vol. 23:429
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to meet another assumed need of the [criminal justice] system - protec-
tion of the community from a defendant during the time it takes the
system to operate. This use of bail [was] implemented tacitly through
the disingenuous device of requiring money bail in an amount beyond
the means of the accused, on the ground that a high risk of flight de-
mands such amount.48
This form of detention was accomplishd sub rosa because dangerous de-
fendants could not be denied bail under existing law.
B. Statutory Law
1. The Bail Reform Act of 1966
The Bail Reform Act of 196649 was enacted primarily to protect
those defendants who lacked the financial resources to post bail before
trial.50 The 1966 Act reflected a reform of the bail system which was
prompted by several Supreme Court decisions rejecting financial re-
sources as a relevant factor in the administration of criminal justice,5' the
failure of the surety bond mechanism to motivate a defendant to ap-
pear, 2 a reduction in the instances of successful flight to avoid prosecu-
tion, 3 and a growing concern for prisoners' rights in the 1960's.54
REP. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
3182, 3187.
The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 33, 1 Stat. 7391 and the eighth amendment established the
use of bail in the American criminal justice system. Bail is a device for the pretrial release of a
criminal defendant after security has been taken for the defendant's future appearance at trial. It
serves to balance and accommodate the defendant's interest in liberty while awaiting trial and soci-
ety's interest in ensuring that the defendant will return for trial. Note, The Eighth Amendment,
supra, at 329-30. The system of bail enables a defendant to stay out of jail until he is tried. Id.
48. Hickey, supra note 1, at 288 (citations omitted).
49. The Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3141-3152 (1982) (repealed 1984)).
50. Note, Pretrial Incarceration, supra note 39, at 1070.
51. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to counsel for indigents in first
appeal for criminal convictions); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel for
indigents at critical stages of proceeding); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (filing fees cannot
bar indigent from habeas corpus proceedings); Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (appellate filing
fees cannot bar indigent); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (lack of funds to buy a stenographic
transcript of the trial cannot bar indigent from post conviction proceedings).
52. Hickey, supra note 1, at 288-89. The bond is normally posted by a professional bondsman.
The defendant's payment of fee to the bondsman is his only investment in the bond, and it is not
returned regardless of whether he flees or appears for trial. Id.
53. Id. at 289. Improvements in law enforcement, communication, identification techniques,
and facilities have inhibited successful flight. Id. See, Note, Bail: An Ancient Practice Reexamined,
70 YALE L.J. 966, 973 (1961).
54. Note, Pretrial Incarceration, supra note 39, at 1070 n.80. See generally Ervin, The Legisla-
tive Role in Bail Reform, 35 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 429 (1967) (discussing events which led up to the
passage of the Bail Reform Act of 1966).
1988]
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The provisions of the 1966 Act were designed to eliminate preven-
tive detention by prohibiting the prevailing practice of imposing excessive
financial conditions of bail." According to the 1966 Act, a court could
detain a defendant while awaiting trial only if evidence was sufficient that
he would jeopardize the successful operation of the criminal justice sys-
tem by fleeing before trial or that he would present a threat to a partici-
pant in the judicial process.5 6 Release on personal recognizance while
awaiting trial was encouraged by the provisions of the 1966 Act and gave
rise to a presumption of a right to bail in noncapital offenses. 7 Congress
clearly rejected the use of pretrial bail as a device to protect the commu-
nity from the possible commission of additional crimes by the arrestee.58
Despite the prohibitions of the 1966 Act, the judicial practice of set-
ting unreasonable and excessive bail in order to detain defendants contin-
ued to flourish. 9 Although this sub rosa system of preventive detention
may have been accepted, its effectiveness was limited because it provided
no protection against defendants who were dangerous but financially
able, such as organized crime figures.60 The fairness of this method of
pretrial detention was also questionable because it lacked parameters for
determining dangerousness and lacked procedural controls for protecting
the accused who was thought to be dangerous.61
2. The District of Columbia Preventive Detention Statute
Four years after the passage of the Bail Reform Act of 1966, Con-
gress overcame its reluctance to address the issue of pretrial custody and
enacted a preventive detention statute for the District of Columbia. 62
The statute allowed the pretrial detention of defendants, based on a pre-
diction of dangerousness, after a judicial finding that there was substan-
tial probability that the defendant committed the offense with which he
was charged.63 Although the measure gave judges broad discretionary
power, pretrial detention required a showing that no condition of release
55. Note, Pretrial Incarceration, supra note 39, at 1071.
56. Id. at 1072.
57. Id. at 1071.
58. H.R. REP. No. 1541, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. -, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 2293, 2296.
59. Serr, supra note 30, at 169; Note, Preventive Detention, supra note 39, at 1492-93.
60. Note, Preventive Detention, supra note 39, at 1493.
61. Id.
62. The District of Columbia Statute, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1321 to -1332 (1981 & Supp.
1986).
63. Id. at § 23-1322(b)(2)(C).
[Vol. 23:429
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would assure the safety of the community."4 At that time, the District of
Columbia was the only jurisdiction with a statutory basis for preventive
detention.65
Although critics of the District of Columbia statute doubted that it
could withstand a constitutional challenge,66 the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit confirmed the validity of
the statute in a 1982 decision, United States v. Edwards.67 In Edwards,
the defendant had been charged with armed rape. 8 After a hearing, the
court determined that he was a danger to the community, denied him
bail, and detained him until trial.69 He challenged the statute on a con-
stitutional basis, arguing that pretrial custody violated the fifth7° and
eighth amendments.71 The court rejected his argument that preventive
detention, as permitted by the statute, violated the due process clause of
the fifth amendment by punishing before an adjudication of guilt.72
Moreover, the denial of bail permitted by the statute was not inconsistent
with the eighth amendment prohibition of excessive bail.73 The Edwards
court, however, expressed some concerns about preventive detention and
implied that the length of detention was critical to the statute's validity.
74
3. The Bail Reform Act of 1984
Reassured by the ability of the District of Columbia statute to sur-
vive constitutional scrutiny in Edwards, Congress nationalized the prac-
tice of preventive detention by passing the Bail Reform Act of 1984.75
This was a legislative response to the problem of crimes being committed
64. Id. at § 23-1322(a)(1).
65. Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1163 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated as moot sub nom Murphy v.
Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982) (per curiam).
66. Note, Pretrial Incarceration, supra note 39, at 1074-75.
67. 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
68. Id. at 1324.
69. Id. at 1325.
70. Id. at 1331.
71. Id. at 1325.
72. Id. at 1331.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1333.
75. S. REP. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEvs 3182, 3191. "Based on its own constitutional analysis and its review of the Edwards decision,
the Committee is satisfied that pretrial detention is not per se unconstitutional." Id.
1988]
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by defendants released from custody76 and the need to give judicial of-
ficers sufficient authority to regulate pretrial release." The Act specifi-
cally proscribes the use of financial conditions to impose detention.
Instead, the Act's provisions explicitly authorizes a court to consider the
arrestee's dangerousness when ordering detention or setting conditions of
release.79 Although pretrial release is still the general rule under the
Act,80 detention may be ordered when no condition or combination of
conditions will reasonably assure the safety of the community."
C. Case Law
During its consideration of the Act, Congress correctly predicted
that the excessive bail clause of the eighth amendment, and the due pro-
cess clause of the fifth amendment, would provide the basis for argu-
ments to invalidate the Act. 82 Congress relied on the decision in
Edwards to conclude that the Act would withstand these constitutional
challenges.8 3 The courts in all but three circuits 4 have addressed these
76. S. REP. No. 98-225, 98TH CONG., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEws 3182, 3185. "Federal bail laws must address the alarming problem of crimes committed
by persons on release .. " Id.
77. Id. "Federal bail laws must.., give the courts adequate authority to make release deci-
sions that give appropriate recognition to the danger a person may pose to others if released." Id.
78. The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c). "The judicial officer may not impose a
financial condition that results in the pretrial detention of the person." Id.
79. Id. at § 3142(g)(4) and (c)(2).
80. Serr, supra note 30, at 169.
81. The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).
82. S. REP. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 3182, 3191.
83. Id.
84. Although the courts in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have addressed statutory chal-
lenges, none have addressed the constitutional challenges presented in Salerno III, 107 S. Ct. 2095
(1987). See United States v. Williams, 753 F.2d 329, 335 (4th Cir. 1985) (discussing the type of
evidence of dangerousness required to be presented by the government to constitute clear and con-
vincing); United States v. Fortna, 769 F.2d 243, 251 (5th Cir. 1985) (discussing release conditions
which may constitute reasonable assurance of appearance at trial); United States v. Hazime, 762
F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir. 1985) (discussing the burdens of production and persuasion as affected by the
rebuttable presumption of flight).
Other issues have also been addressed. The courts have upheld the probable cause standard for
evaluating the underlying criminal charges as a constitutionally adequate basis for pretrial detention.
United States v. Freitas, 602 F. Supp. 1283 (N.D. Cal. 1985); United States v. Payden, 598 F. Supp.
1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 759 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1985). The Bail Reform Act of
1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) requires detention upon a finding that release conditions will not assure
appearance at trial and the safety of the community. The courts have determined that detention may
be justified soley on either risk of flight or risk of danger. United States v. Jessup, 757 F.2d 378, 388
(Ist Cir. 1985); United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390, 1401 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v.
Kouyoumdjian, 601 F. Supp. 1506, 1510 (C.D. Cal. 1985); United States v. Askari, 608 F. Supp.
1045, 1048 (E.D. Pa. 1985). 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) includes the presumption that no conditions of
release will assure the safety of the community. The presumption is triggered by the nature of the
underlying crime or the history of the defendant. The courts have determined that the effect of this
10
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challenges and, with the exception of the Second Circuit,85 have rejected
the argument that the Act is unconstitutional on its face.
1. The Eighth Amendment
The validity of the Act depends initially on the interpretation of the
eighth amendment provision86 that "excessive bail shall not be re-
quired."87 Interpreted broadly, the clause implies a right to bail. Inter-
preted narrowly, the clause prohibits excessive bail, but operates only in
circumstances where bail is otherwise authorized.88 The scope of the
guarantee provided by the eighth amendment has been a controversial
question and has not been interpreted directly by the Supreme Court.89
The federal courts addressing the constitutionality of the Act have
narrowly interpreted the eighth amendment guarantee and found no ab-
solute right to bail. To reach this conclusion, the courts have relied pri-
marily on one of two precedential bases: (1) the history of the eighth
amendment discussed by the Supreme Court in Carlson v. Landon;9° or
(2) the exhaustive, multi-factored evaluation presented in United States v.
presumption is to shift to the defendant the burden of production of evidence to rebut the presump-
tion. The defendant, however, does not bear the burden of persuasion; he does not have to prove
that there are conditions of release that would assure the safety of the community. Jessup, 757 F.2d
at 381; Freitas, 602 F. Supp. at 1293; United States v. Moore, 607 F. Supp. 489, 497 (N.D. Cal.
1985).
85. Prior to the appellate court decision in Salerno II, 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1986), the Second
Circuit had found that the provisions of the Act related to detention for risk of danger were uncon-
stitutional in violation of the substantive due process provisions of the fifth amendment. The case
was remanded to the lower court to determine if the defendants who had been detained originally on
the basis of risk or danger had also posed a risk of flight. The lower court determined that they had.
On appeal after remand, the appeals court upheld the provisions of the Act related to detention for
risk of flight. United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 1002 (2d Cir. 1985).
86. If the eighth amendment contains an absolute right to bail, the Act is unconstituional on its
face, and no other issues are reached. By implication, the court in Salerno I1, 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir.
1986), found no absolute right to bail and limited its discussion to other issues. Although the
Supreme Court failed to squarely address the nature of the right contained in the eighth amendment,
its reasoning allowed it to discuss the fifth amendment issue first. See infra notes 137-42 and accom-
panying text.
87. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
88. Note, The Eighth Amendment, supra note 47, at 328.
89. See Duker, The Right to Bail A Historical Inquiry, 42 ALB. L. REv. 33 (1977) (no right to
bail); Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U. PA. L. Rlv. 959 (1965) (eighth
amendment provides a right to bail); Meyer, Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention (pt. 1), 60 GEO.
L.J. 1140 (1972) (no right to bail); Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial Deten-
tion, 55 VA. L. REv. 1223 (1969) (no right to bail); Tribe, An Ounce of Detention. Preventive Justice
in the World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REv. 371 (1970) (right to bail).
90. 342 U.S. 524, 544 (1952). Cases relying on this basis include United States v. Perry, 788
F.2d 100, 111 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 218 (1986); United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 600 F.
Supp. 501, 506 (D.P.R. 1984), aff'd, 755 F.2d 203 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Hazzard 598 F.
Supp. 1442, 1448 (N.D. 11. 1984).
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Edwards.91
The Court in Carlson determined that the eighth amendment did
not grant a right to bail in deportation proceedings. 2 Carlson involved
the denial of bail, pending deportation hearings, to alien Communists
who were believed dangerous.93 To determine if the eighth amendment
provided a right to bail in these specific circumstances, the Court ana-
lyzed the history of the amendment:
The bail clause was lifted with slight changes from the English
Bill of Rights Act. In England that clause has never been thought to
accord a right to bail in all cases, but merely to provide that bail shall
not be excessive in those cases where it is proper to grant bail. When
this clause was carried over into our Bill of Rights, nothing was said
that indicated any different concept.94
Lower courts have relied on and expanded this narrow holding to deny a
constitutional right to bail in other circumstances.9"
During its evaluation of the District of Columbia's preventive deten-
tion statute, the court in United States v. Edwards96 examined many fac-
tors to conclude that the eighth amendment does not guarantee a right to
bail. To reach this conclusion, the Edwards court analyzed the history of
the English system of bail,97 colonial and state constitutional bail
rights, 98 the history of the Bill of Rights,9 9 case law, 1" and the constitu-
tional scheme.0 1 Federal courts have relied upon various elements of
the Edwards discussion without further elaboration. 102
91. 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981) (en banc), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982). Cases relying on
the Edwards analysis of the right to bail include: United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 766 (7th Cir.
1985); United States v. Rawls, 620 F. Supp. 1358, 1360 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Acevedo-Ramos, 600 F.
Supp. at 505.
92. Carlson, 342 U.S. at 546. "We think, clearly, here that the Eighth Amendment does not
require that bail be allowed under the circumstances of these [deportation] cases." Id.
93. Id. at 550.
94. Id. at 545 (footnotes omitted).
95. Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1330; United States ex rel Covington v. Coparo, 297 F. Supp. 203,
206 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See generally Note, Preventive Detention, supra note 39, at 1498-1500.
96. 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
97. Id. at 1326-27.
98. Id. at 1327-28.
99. Id. at 1328-29.
100. Id. at 1329-30.
101. Id. at 1330-31.
102. See, eg., United States v. Rawls, 620 F. Supp. 1358, 1360 (E.D. Pa. 1985). Other federal
courts have employed sound independent reasoning to deny an absolute right to bail. The court in
United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1986), for example, concluded that the
existence of traditional instances of denial of bail argued against an absolute guarantee of bail. Id. at
998.
The court in Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1158 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated as moot sub nom,
Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982) reasoned that only arbitrary and unreasonable denial of bail
[Vol. 23:429
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2. The Fifth Amendment
The validity of preventive detention, as authorized by the Act, must
be evaluated in light of the fifth amendment guarantee that "[n]o person
shall.., be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law.... "'I' In order to protect the interests of individuals, the Court has
fashioned two parameters of due process for evaluating government dep-
rivations. First, substantive due process addresses the nature of the gov-
ernment action and "prevents the government from engaging in conduct
that 'shocks the conscience' or interferes with rights 'implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty.' ""l Second, procedural due process addresses
the method used to implement the restriction.,05 Both aspects of the Act
have been challenged.
a. Substantive due process
The substantive validity of the Act turns on whether detention prior to
trial constitutes punishment. The right to be free of punishment is inher-
ent in the word liberty as used in the due process clause and interpreted
in previous Court decisions.1 6 If the deprivation of liberty through
physical confinement serves as punishment, it cannot be imposed without
a proof of guilt as required by the fourth and fifth amendments. 0 7 Thus,
the focus of any analysis of preventive detention is whether the restraint
is imposed to punish or whether the detention is incidental to some other
legitimate governmental purpose.
The majority of federal courts which have upheld the Act in re-
sponse to substantive due process challenges have determined that the
detention is regulatory rather than punitive.' 8 The character of the gov-
ernment action is established by a multi-faceted test as employed in two
cases dealing with preventive detention statutes, United States v. Ed-
wards 109 and Schall v. Martin.'10
violated the prohibition of excessive bail. The right to bail, then, can be regulated if done so "ration-
ally, reasonably, and without discrimination." Id. at 1161 (footnote omitted).
103. U.S. CONsT. amend V.
104. Salerno Ill, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2101 (1987) (citations omitted).
105. Id.
106. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
107. U.S. CONsT. amends. IV & V.
108. United States v. Zannino, 798 F.2d 544, 546 (Ist Cir. 1986) relies on the dissent in Salerno
I1, 794 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1986) without elaboration. United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 112-13 (3d
Cir.), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 218 (1986) relies on a line of cases authorizing detention of the mentally
ill.
109. 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981) (en banc), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982). The cases relying
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The federal courts agree that the passage of time is an integral com-
ponent of the due process analysis. Every appellate court that has ex-
amined the substantive due process aspects of the Act has indicated that
preventive detention may be invalid if prolonged unduly) 11 Moreover,
some courts have found pretrial detention too prolonged in certain in-
stances to withstand the due process challenge and have ordered re-
lease.112 However, only the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has held
that the failure of the Act to strictly limit the period of detention renders
the Act unconstitutional on its face.113 This disagreement between the
circuits prompted the Court to hear the Salerno challenge.
b. Procedural due process
The validity of the procedural provisions of the Act depends upon
whether the procedures properly balance the competing interests of the
individual with that of the government, as well as afford sufficient protec-
tion against erroneous or unnecessary detention. A test for evaluating
procedures for compliance with due process was originally articulated by
the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge.1 1 4 The test requires consid-
eration of three factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected by
the action, (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation through the proce-
dures used and the probable value of additional or substitute procedures,
and (3) the government's interest in prompting the action." 5 The fed-
eral courts that have addressed the procedural issue have relied on this
on this discussion of the test include: United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 767 (7th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Maull, 773 F.2d 1479, 1485 (8th Cir. 1985).
110. 467 U.S. 253 (1984). Cases relying on this application of the test include: United States v.
Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 998 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 600 F. Supp.
501, 505 (D.P.R. 1984), aff'd, 755 F.2d 203 (Ist Cir. 1985).
111. United States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v. Colombo,
777 F.2d 96, 101 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 768 (7th Cir. 1985); cf.
Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1337 (stressing the time limits on detention in upholding the D.C. Statute).
112. See, eg., Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984. Considering the eight month detention for dan-
gerousness of members of a terrorist organization accused of a $7.6 million Wells Fargo robbery, one
member of the three judge panel found the Bail Reform Act of 1984 unconstitutional on its face. Id.
at 1004. Another found the Act as applied unconstitutional. Id. at 1008. The case was remanded to
the lower court to determine if the defendants posed a risk of flight. Id. at 1004. In United States v.
Theron, 782 F.2d 1510 (10th Cir. 1986), a defendant, denied severance from codefendants and de-
tained more than four months, was ordered to be tried or released within thirty days because pretrial
detention assumes a punitive character when it is prolonged significantly. Id. at 1516-17. In United
States v. Lofranco, 620 F. Supp. 1324, 1325 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), appeal dismissed sub nom., U.S. v.
Cheeseman, 783 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986), the case was remanded with instructions to release under
appropriate circumstances after the defendant had been detained over six months.
113. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
114. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
115. Id.
14
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test to affirm the validity of the Act. 116
IV. DECISION OF THE CASE
In United States v. Salerno,117 the Supreme Court validated preven-
tive detention as authorized by the Act. The Court analyzed the provi-
sions of the Act in light of the prohibition of excessive bail found in the
eighth amendment and the substantive and procedural requirements of
the fifth amendment. In the opinion of the Court, the practice of incar-
ceration prior to trial in order to protect the community does not violate
the Constitution. 8
A. The Eighth Amendment
In concluding that the Act does not violate the substantive limita-
tions of the eighth amendment, 1 9 the Salerno Court found it unneces-
sary to establish or deny a constitutional right to bail.1" Although the
Court failed to resolve this issue, it established that the government may
pursue compelling interests through the regulation of bail.12" ' The right
to reasonableness in setting either conditions of release or detention is the
ultimate guarantee of the bail clause. 22 Moreover, the Act is reasonable
as a response to the perceived dangers to society occasioned by the re-
lease of certain defendants described in the Act.12 3
116. United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 113 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 218 (1986) relies
on the test as originally articulated in Mathews. United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 600 F. Supp. 501,
506 (D.P.R. 1984), aff'd, 755 F.2d 203 (1st Cir. 1985) and United States v. Hazzard, 598 F. Supp.
1442, 1450 (N.D. Ill. 1984) rely on the test as applied in Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390, 1397 (3d Cir. 1985) relies on the test as applied in Gerstein
v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (evaluating procedures used at the bail hearing of defendants charged
by prosecutor's information).
117. 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987).
118. Id. at 2100-05. "We are unwilling to say that this congressional determination, based as it
is upon that primary concern of every government - a concern for the safety and indeed the lives of
its citizens - on its face violates either the Due Process Clause... or the Eighth Amendment." Id.
at 2105.
119. Id.
120. Id. The Court has considered this right twice in its history: Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1
(1951) (addressing the reduction of excessive bail) and Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952)
(addressing the denial of bail). Lower courts have relied alternatively on dicta from both cases to
find or deny a constitutional right to bail, but have failed to achieve a consistent result. United
States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1330 (D.C. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
See Note, Preventive Detention, supra note 39, at 1498-1500.
121. Salerno III, 107 S. Ct. at 2105. "We believe that when Congress has mandated detention
on the basis of a compelling interest other than prevention of flight, as it has here, the Eighth
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The Court dismissed the argument that bail could be denied only for
reasons related to the risk of flight by distinguishing Stack v. Boyle, 124 a
case holding that bail set at an amount greater than necessary to assure
the presence of the accused at trial was excessive. 125 Stack involved a
statute permitting bail for .the declared limited purpose of ensuring the
presence of the defendant at trial.' 26 The bail set was excessive in light of
the stated purpose of the statute and thus violated the eighth amend-
ment.127 Because the defendants had been admitted to bail, the Stack
Court addressed only the right to bail defined in the statute and had no
occasion to consider what universal right might exist under the eighth
amendment. 128
The Salerno Court relied on the analysis of the history of the eighth
amendment espoused in Carlson v. Landon 129 to affirm the validity of the
Act.1 30 Because the English bail clause on which the eighth amendment
was based did not accord a right to bail in all cases, no right was inherent
in the American bail clause.13 1  Moreover, the very language of the
amendment failed to announce such a right.13
2
B. The Fifth Amendment
The Salerno Court analyzed the provisions of the Bail Reform Act
of 1984 in light of the substantive and procedural parameters of the fifth
amendment guarantee that "no person shall... be deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law ... and determined
that the Act reflected a limited exception to the liberty interest.13 4 Be-
cause preventive detention is regulatory rather than punitive and serves
the government's legitimate and compelling interest in community
safety, it satisfies substantive due process requirements. 3  Moreover, the
124. 342 U.S. 1 (1951). The Court in Salerno III distinguished Stack: "The... dicta in Stack v.
Boyle is far too slender a reed on which to rest this argument." Salerno III, 107 S. Ct. at 2104.
125. Stack, 342 U.S. at 5.
126. Id. at 5.
127. Salerno III, 107 S. Ct. at 2104. "[Ihe Court had to determine only whether bail, admit-
tedly available in that case, was excessive.. . ." Id.
128. Id. "The Court in Stack had no occasion to consider whether the Excessive Bail Clause
requires courts to admit all defendants to bail .... Id.
129. 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
130. Salerno III, 107 S. Ct. at 2104-05.
131. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545.
132. Id. at 545-46.
133. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
134. Salerno III, 107 S. Ct. at 2105.
135. Id. at 2101-02.
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procedures leading to detention are narrowly tailored to provide ade-
quate safeguards to the rights of an accused, and therefore, satisfy the
procedural due process requirements.136 The pretrial detention author-
ized by the Bail Reform Act of 1984 does not deprive a defendant of
liberty without due process.
137
1. Substantive Due Process
The Salerno Court originally focused on whether preventive deten-
tion was imposed to punish or whether it was incidental to some other
legitimate governmental purpose. Because the Supreme Court has
squarely held that due process of law prohibits punishment of a defend-
ant prior to an adjudication of guilt,13 8 the government in Salerno never
took the position that pretrial detention could be sustained if it were
"punishment."' 3 9 Instead, it characterized the Act as regulatory in na-
ture. Moreover, although the court of appeals invalidated the Act, it
viewed the incarceration permitted by the Act as regulatory rather than
punitive."4 The defendant, however, argued that the pretrial detention
authorized by the Act constituted impermissible punishment. 4' The
Court, therefore, focused on whether the restraint was imposed to punish
or whether it was incidental to some other legitimate governmental
purpose.
The Court looked first, as it has traditionally, to legislative intent 42
to determine that the restriction on liberty allowed by the Act constitutes
permissible regulation rather than impermissible punishment. 43 Con-
gress, no doubt in anticipation of judicial review, presented a legislative
history replete with references to its intent not to punish, but rather to
address the compelling needs of community safety and to protect the
community from the pressing problem presented by dangerous defend-
ants.'" The history of the Act required no analysis to conclude, as did
the Court, that Congress did not intend pretrial detention to impose
136. Id. at 2103-04.
137. Id. at 2104.
138. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 528 (1979). "[Uinder the Due Process Clause, a detainee may
not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law." Id. at 535.
139. Salerno Ifi, 107 S. Ct. at 2101.
140. lId
141. Id.
142. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Ser., 433 U.S. 425, 478 (1977); Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169-70 (1963); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 308-14 (1946).
143. Salerno Ii, 107 S. Ct. at 2101.
144. S. R P. No. 98-225, 98TH CONG., 2d Sess. 3, 7, 8, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3182, at 3185, 3190, 3191.
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punishment. 145
Finding no express congressional intent to prescribe punitive restric-
tions, the Court focused on a two-pronged ends-means test to determine
the character of the detention: (1) was there a rational alternative non-
punitive purpose for the detention, and (2) was the detention reasonably
related to a legitimate government objective.146 The legislative history of
the Act demonstrated that despite the potential penal effects of detention,
the law was enacted to solve a serious societal problem. 47 Protecting the
community from dangerous defendants was a legitimate regulatory goal,
and the preventive detention authorized by the Act was reasonably re-
lated to that goal. 148 To further support the conclusion that the sanction
and the goal were reasonably related, the Court pointed to the carefully
limited circumstances under which the Act could be invoked, t4 9 the time
constraints on both the original decision to detain 5° and the deten-
tion,' and the physical conditions of the confinement.152
In its final test of the substantive nature of the Act, the Court bal-
anced the government's interest in preventing crime with the defendant's
strong interest in liberty.153  The Act applies only to individuals who
have been arrested for specifically designated dangerous offenses."5 4 Ad-
ditionally, the government must demonstrate probable cause that the
arrestee committed the crime charged, 55 and must convince a neutral
decision-maker, by clear and convincing evidence, that no conditions of
release will assure the safety of the community.'56 Under these circum-
stances, the Court found society's overwhelming interest in crime preven-
tion is at its greatest and must override the individual's strong interest in
145. Salerno III, 107 S. Ct. at 2101.
146. Id at 2101-03.
147. Id. at 2101.
148. Id.
149. Id. (citing the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)). Detention on the basis of
dangerousness is permitted only in cases that involve a crime of violence, an offense punishable by
death or life imprisonment, certain drug offenses punishable by imprisonment for ten years or more,
or felonies committed after certain prior convictions. Id.
150. Id. The detention hearing must be held at the defendant's first appearance before a judicial
officer subject to a maximum continuance of only five days. Id.
151. Id. (citing the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1982 & Supp. III 1985))). Maximum detention prior to trial is
limited to ninety days, subject to certain excludable periods of delay. Id.
152. Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i). The defendant is to be confined in facilities
separate from persons awaiting or serving sentence or being held in custody pending appeal, to the
extent practicable. Id.
153. Salerno II, 107 S. Ct. at 2102-03.
154. Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f).








Although the Court noted that detention becomes punitive when
prolonged excessively,' 58 it failed to address the permissible length of
pretrial detention. The Court found that the provisions of the Speedy
Trial Act, on its face, limit the period of pretrial incarceration. 159 How-
ever, the Salerno Court provided no parameters for determining when
the provisions of the Speedy Trial Act, as applied, result in a period of
detention that violates the limits of due process.
2. Procedural Due Process
Having found nothing in the substance of the Act which violated
some fundamental principle of justice, 6 ' the Court briefly addressed the
procedures of the Act and found them sufficient to protect the liberty
interest of the defendant. 6' The Act specified that defendants "have a
right to counsel at the detention hearing, . . . may testify in their own
behalf, present information by proffer or otherwise, and cross-examine
witnesses who appear at the hearing."'16 2 Furthermore, the government
had to prove its prediction of dangerousness by clear and convincing evi-
dence,163 and the statute enumerates factors to support the prediction.'"
The judicial officer must prepare for appellate review "written findings of
fact and a ... statement of reasons for a decision to detain.' 6  The
Court found the procedures narrowly tailored to improve the accuracy of
the prediction of dangerousness 166 and comprehensive in providing sub-
stantial safeguards for the rights of the accused. 6 7
157. Salerno III, 107 S. Ct. at 2103.
158. Id. at 2101 n.4. "We intimate no view as to the point at which detention in a particular case
might become excessively prolonged, and therefore punitive, in relation to Congress' regulatory
goal." Id.
159. Id at 2101. "[IThe maximum length of pretrial detention is limited by the stringent time
limitations of the Speedy Trial Act." Id.
160. Id. at 2103.
161. Id. at 2104.
162. Id. at 2103-04 (noting the requirements under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(f)).
163. Id. at 2104 (citing the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)).
164. Id. (citing the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)). The factors include: the
nature and circumstance of the charges including whether the crime involves violence or drugs; the
weight of the evidence; the history and character of the defendant; and the nature and seriousness of
the danger posed by the defendant's release. Id.
165. Id. (citing the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i)).
166. Id. at 2103. "[T]he procedures by which a judicial officer evaluates the likelihood of future
dangerousness are specifically designed to further the accuracy of that determination." Id
167. Id. at 2104. "We think these extensive safeguards suffice to repel a facial challenge." Id.
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V. ANALYSIS
A. The Eighth Amendment
The Salerno Court concluded that the right to be free of excessive
bail guaranteed by the eighth amendment does not prohibit the preven-
tive detention authorized by the Act. 168 Although the Court based its
conclusion that bail can be denied by Congress on an arguable interpreta-
tion of the history of the eighth amendment, there remains ample sup-
port for detention in the history and evolution of federal bail statutes.
Ultimately, as with other constitutional rights, the reasonableness of the
restraint determines its validity.
Although the Court found precedential value for congressional de-
nial of bail in Carlson v. Landon,169 this case is inapplicable to denial of
bail in criminal cases because it deals with alien deportation. Aliens have
traditionally received a reduced level of constitutional protection.170
Moreover, special considerations applicable to deportation' 7 ' have given
rise to basic policy differences 72 that distinguish criminal and deporta-
tion cases. The Carlson Court itself emphasized the broad power of
Congress to deal with aliens 173 and cited previous cases questioning the
applicability of the eighth amendment to deportation cases.'7" The Carl-
son Court concluded that if applicable at all, the eighth amendment did
168. Id. at 2105.
169. 342 U.S. 524 (1952). In both cases, the defendants were lawfully arrested. Salerno III, 107
S. Ct. at 2105. In Carlson, the defendant was charged with violations of the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 371, 2385 (1982), a statute proscribing communist activities. In Salerno, the defendant allegedly
violated the RICO Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982), a statute proscribing racketeering activities. The
defendants in both cases were awaiting proceedings to consider limitations on their future liberty. In
Carlson, the Immigration and Naturalization Service would conduct a hearing to consider deporta-
tion. Carlson, 342 U.S. at 526-27. In Salerno, the defendant awaited a criminal trial to determine
guilt and punishment. In both cases, the defendants had been determined to be dangerous and
denied bail for that reason.
170. Note, The Eighth Amendment, supra note 47, at 341 n.78.
171. Jonal Corp. v. District of Columbia, 533 F.2d 1192, 1202 (D.C. Cir.) (Leventhal, J., dissent-
ing in part) ("exigiences of volume and location" have given rise to "special tradition and require-
ments" in deportation proceedings), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976).
172. See, eg., Comment, Fedorenko v. United States: War Crimes, the Defense of Duress, and
American Nationality Law, 82 COLUM. L. RE,. 120 (1982).
173. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 542-44 (1952).
174. Id. at 545 (citing United States ex rel. Potash v. District Director, 169 F.2d 747 (2d Cir.
1948) which reported previous denial of the applicabilty of the eighth amendment to deportation
proceedings); United States ex rel Klig v. Shaughnessy, 94 F. Supp. 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (question-
ing whether deportation proceedings fall within the scope of the eighth amendment).
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not require bail in deportation cases.175 The congressional ability to reg-
ulate bail in deportation cases176 is clearly inapplicable as a basis for au-
thority to regulate bail for criminal defendants.
The Salerno Court's reliance on the conclusion in Carlson, that the
absence of a fundamental right to bail under English law precluded the
existence of the right in the eighth amendment,177 was misplaced. The
history of the eighth amendment as a basis for denying a right to bail has
been significantly discounted by scholars, 178 lower courts, 17 9 and the
Supreme Court itself. 8 The United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit conducted an exhaustive examination of the
origins of the excess bail clause in United States v. Edwards181 and found
that the history of the eighth amendment shed no light on the right to
bail.182 Moreover, the Supreme Court acknowledged in Bridges v. Cali-
fornia 83 that one of the purposes of the American Revolution was to
secure greater and additional personal rights than those enjoyed under
the English Bill of Rights. 84 The history of the eighth amendment,
therefore, does not compel the conclusion that no right exists in the
Constitution.
Neither the failure of constitutional history to determine the param-
eters of a right to bail, nor the Court's questionable conclusion that it
did, undermines the validity of preventive detention as expressed in the
Act. The historical evidence demonstrates that the framers of the eighth
175. Carlson, 342 U.S. at 546. "We think, clearly, here that the Eighth Amendment does not
require that bail be allowed under the circumstances of [deportation] cases." Id.
176. Id. at 545. "The Eighth Amendment has not prevented Congress from defining the classes
of cases in which bail shall be allowed in this country."' Id.
177. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
178. Note, The Eighth Amendment, supra note 47. "The specific intent of the Framers simply
cannot be divined from the historical evidence of the pre-1789 period. Perhaps the only reasonable
conclusion that can be drawn from this evidence is that the Framers did not consider the parameters
of a right to bail at all when they passed the eighth amendment." Id. at 350. See also Duker, The
Right To Bail: A Historical Inquiry, 42 ALB. L. Rav. 33 (1977); Meyer, Constitutionality of Pretrial
Detention (pt. 1), supra note 89; Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention,
supra note 89.
179. United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1330 (D.C. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1022 (1982).
180. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 264 (1941).
181. 430 A.2d 1321, 1325-31 (D.C. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
182. Id. at 1326. "The history of the Eighth Amendment... is generally unilluminating ..
Id.
183. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
184. Id. at 264.
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amendment did not consider the denial of bail on the grounds of danger-
ousness.18 5 This does not mean that the eighth amendment can be fairly
interpreted to prohibit or permit the denial of bail on those grounds. It
means only that the history of the eighth amendment provides no direct
support for preventive detention.
Congressional denial of bail finds its authority, not in the history of
the Constitution, but in the history of federal statutes. At the federal
level, the right of a defendant in a criminal case to be free while awaiting
trial has always been regulated by Congress.186 From the Judiciary Act
of 1789187 to the Bail Reform Act of 1984,18 bail in noncapital cases has
traditionally been a right grounded in federal statutes.18 9 Thus, Congress
can alter the statutory right.
As the Carlson Court suggested and the Salerno decision confirms,
the right to be free from excessive bail, when construed in the light of
statutory history, reflects only the right to be free of unreasonable denial
of bail. 90 The parameters for this denial are not found in the eighth
amendment. The substantive and procedural protections of personal lib-
erty inherent in the due process clause of the fifth amendment dictate the
standards for denial of bail and determine when detention is a reasonable
denial of liberty.
B. The Fifth Amendment
1. Substantive Due Process
The Salerno Court concluded that the preventive detention author-
ized by the Bail Reform Act of 1984 did not violate the fifth amend-
ment. 9' Analysis of the nature of the detention led the Court to decide
that the provisions of the Act were regulatory and, therefore, did not
constitute punishment before trial, a practice prohibited by substantive
due process.192 The length of detention allowed by the Act was critical
to the Court's conclusion that pretrial incarceration was not an excessive
185. United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022
(1982).
186. Meyer, Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention (pt. 1), supra note 89 at 1164. "[W]hether...
a person arrested for a crime has a right to be released pending the disposition of his case has, on the
federal level, always been regulated by statutes." Id.
187. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 33, 1 Stat. 91 (1845).
188. Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3141-50.
189. Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1331.
190. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 540-41 (1952); Salerno II1, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2099 (1987).
191. Salerno III, 107 S. Ct. at 2103.
192. Id at 2101-03.
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means for achieving the government's regulatory goal. 193
a. The punitive/regulatory distinction
In order to determine if the purpose of an action is punitive or regu-
latory, courts have traditionally applied a multi-faceted test to determine
the character of a governmental act:
whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment - retribution and deter-
rence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,
whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be con-
nected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation
to the alternative purpose assigned....
Because the many factors to be considered in making the punitive/regu-
latory distinction point in differing directions, the Salerno Court chose to
articulate only those elements of the test which clearly supported its ulti-
mate decision. 195 Although the failure to fully communicate the analysis
may lessen the precedential value of the opinion in resolving future puni-
tive/regulatory distinctions, it does not weaken the Court's conclusion.
The differing conclusions that can be drawn about the character of
detention are obvious in the consideration of the nature of the restraint
96
and its historical characterization. 197 No analysis is required to conclude
that detention is punitive and imposes an affirmative restraint on individ-
ual liberty. In terms of the nature of the imposition and its impact on the
193. Id. at 2101.
194. United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1332 (D.C. 1981) (en bane), cert denied, 455
U.S. 1022 (1982) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537-38 (1979), which quotes Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)). Although Schall applies this test, it does not
articulate it as clearly or completely.
195. Salerno II, 107 S. Ct. at 2108. (Marshall, J., dissenting). "The majority's technique for
infringing this right [to be free from punishment before conviction] is simple: merely redefine any
measure which is claimed to be punishment as 'regulation,' and, magically, the Constitution no
longer prohibits its imposition." Id.
196. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (termination of deported alien's social
security benefits is not punishment); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316 (1946) (exclusion
from government service is punishment); Exparte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 343 (1866) (loyalty oath for
admission to the bar constitutes punishment).
197. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237-38 (1896) (imprisonment at hard labor
considered punishment); Exparte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 426-29 (1885) (imprisonment at hard labor
for a term of years considered punishment); Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 320-21 (1866)
(denial of civil rights considered punishment).
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detainee, pretrial detention is essentially indistinguishable from punish-
ment. 198 On the other hand, historical evidence supports the conclusion
that pretrial detention is not regarded as punishment. 199 Incarceration to
prevent flight or to prevent the coercion or intimidation of witnesses is
not regarded as punishment.2" Other exceptions to the view of deten-
tion as punishment include the time that a defendant spends in custody
between arrest and arraignment,201 the civil commitment of mentally ill
persons unable to take care of themselves,2 2  and the state's physical
control over juveniles in its parens patriae capacity without benefit of
trial.20 3
The factors of scienter and of triggering behavior suggest a punitive
character of detention. The detention authorized by the Act comes into
play only after arrest for certain dangerous crimes, all of which include
the element of scienter.2 4 Scienter, a backward looking and personal
factor, is associated with punishable actions and is inconsistent with a
forward looking, general regulatory scheme.205 A punitive character is
also indicated by the clear criminal nature of the behavior which triggers
the detention.20 6 The defendant in Salerno and others had been detained
because it was determined that if released, they would again commit the
crimes for which they were arrested.20 7
Furtherance of the traditional aims of punishment is another factor
which fails to clearly determine if preventive detention is punitive or reg-
ulatory. Detention was not intended to promote the traditional penal
198. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 560-61 (1979) (upholding prison regulation of activities of
defendants detained on the basis of risk of flight).
199. See infra notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
200. United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1332 (D.C. 1981) (en bane), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1022 (1982); Carbo v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 662, 668 (1962) (trial court can detain to safe-
guard its own process).
201. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113-14 (1975) (upholding a brief period of detention for
administrative steps incident to arrest).
202. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
203. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 266-67 (1984) (every state permits preventive detention of
juveniles).
204. Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f); see Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 37-
38 (1922) (tax designed to penalize is punishment); Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605, 610-12
(1903) (additional customs duty imposed for carelessly understated value is punishment).
205. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 581-82 n.10 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) "Long-term incar-
ceration and other postconviction sanctions have significant backward-looking, personal, and nor-
mative components. Because they are primarily designed to inflict pain or to 'correct' the individual
because of some past misdeed, the sanctions are considered punitive." Id.
206. See United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935) (tax triggered by criminal charge
is penalty); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1922) (tax triggered by criminal charge is
penalty).
207. Salerno I, 631 F. Supp. 1364, 1375 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("this court recognizes a strong incen-
tive on the part of [the Genovese Family] leadership to continue business as usual").
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goals of retribution or deterrence.2 °8 Incarceration, however, does result
in incapacitation, one of the classic purposes of punishment.20 9 More-
over, it is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the stated nonpunitive
goal of detention with statutes that credit regulatory time spent in jail
prior to a conviction toward subsequent punitive time after conviction.210
Because these elements of the test proved inconclusive, the Court
turned its focus to discovering a purpose for preventive detention, other
than punishment, and evaluating the reasonableness of the detention in
light of that purpose. Congress had declared a goal of preventing danger
to the community, and the Court confirmed that it was legitimate. The
Court then weighed the government's regulatory interest in community
safety against the individual's interest in liberty and determined that pre-
ventive detention was permissible.2 1
The Court discussed several cases, characterizing them as estab-
lished exceptions to the general rule prohibiting detention prior to a judg-
ment of guilt in a criminal trial2" 2 and attempted to fit Salerno within the
exceptions. These previous decisions, however, are inappropriate repre-
sentations of a general rule related to the criminal justice system or the
rule's exceptions, because all of the cases cited in which dangerousness
influenced the decision to detain were civil cases. Although the cases
demonstrate valid subordination of an individual's liberty interest to the
government's regulatory interest, the cases do little to support the
Court's argument because the opinion failed to clearly characterize the
Act as civil in nature. The common thread linking Salerno and the cases
cited is that in each instance a lawful arrest was made and in each case a
208. S. REP. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEvs 3182, 3191. "[P]retrial detention is not intended to promote the traditional aims of punish-
ment such as retribution or deterrence, but... 'is designed to curtail reasonably predictable conduct
....... Id. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958) (purposes of punishment are to reprimand the
wrongdoer and deter others); United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935) (tax triggered
by criminal charges was intended as a deterrent).
209. See United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 999 (2d Cir. 1986) (incapacitation is
a classic purpose of punishment); Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 476
n.40 (1977) (traditional purpose of criminal punishment includes preventive aspects); Specht v. Pat-
terson, 386 U.S. 605, 608-09 (1967) (imprisonment inflicted punishment even though sanction was
designed for preventing individuals from harming public); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458
(1965) ("One of the reasons society imprisons... is to keep [suspects] from inflicting future harm,
but that does not make imprisonment any the less punishment"); In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 650
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (traditional justifications for institutional confinement are retribution, rehabilita-
tion, deterrence, and protection).
210. 18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1982) (to be repealed and recodified at 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (effective
Nov. 1, 1987)) (giving a defendant credit toward a prison term for any time spent in official detention
prior to the time the sentence begins).
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prediction of future dangerous conduct was the basis for confinement.
However, the element missing from the precedents that distinguishes
them from Salerno was that none of the arrestees were held pending a
criminal trial.
Ludecke v. Watkins,213 Carlson v. Landon,214 and Wong Wing v.
United States215 provided no precedents for Salerno because the cases
concerned the detention of potentially dangerous aliens pending deporta-
tion proceedings. The defendant in Salerno was neither an alien nor fac-
ing deportation. The special considerations, applicable to deportation
and basic policy differences between criminal and deportation cases,
render inappropriate any analogies that might be drawn between these
cases and Salerno.216
Similarly, cases dealing with the confinement of the mentally ill are
distinguishable from criminal cases. Addington v. Texas,217 Jackson v.
Indiana,218 and Greenwood v. United States219 concerned mentally unsta-
ble detainees. Although arrest was the first step in the confinement pro-
cess in each case, the fact that criminal charges were pending against the
defendants was legally immaterial as the basis for confinement. Further-
more, in each case, one of the stated goals of confinement was treat-
ment.22° In contrast, the defendant in Salerno suffered no apparent
mental abnormality nor was his confinement intended to be therapeutic.
Although Schall v. Martin 2 21 is factually similar to Salerno, it too
fails to support the Court's conclusions. The case validated the practice
of detaining juveniles prior to a juvenile proceeding if they were consid-
ered to be a continuing danger to the community.222 As the Court in
Schall acknowledged, however, a juvenile proceeding is fundamentally
213. 335 U.S. 160 (1948).
214. 342 U.S. 524 (1952). See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
215. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
216. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text. Similarly, Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78
(1909) does not lend itself to comparison with Salerno. Moyer dealt with arrest and detention under
martial law. No parallels can be drawn because under those circumstances there is no judicial pro-
cess, either civil or criminal.
217. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
218. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
219. 350 U.S. 366 (1956).
220. Addington, 441 U.S. at 421 ("appellant required hospitalization in a closed area to treat his
condition"); Jackson, 406 U.S. at 721-23 (civil commitment statutory scheme requires confinement
of individuals with psychiatric disorders because they require "care, treatment, training or detention
in the interest of the welfare of such person"); Greenwood, 350 U.S. at 367 (purpose of commitment
statute was to "provide for the care and custody of insane persons").
221. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
222. Id. at 255-57.
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different from an adult criminal trial.22 3 Moreover, the preventive deten-
tion scheme analyzed in the case was designed to protect the child, as
well as society, "from the potential consequences of his criminal acts"
and took into consideration the needs and interests of the child.224 No
such consideration was given to the needs and interests of the defendant
in Salerno.225
Preventive detention under the Act is a civil proceeding, not an ex-
ception to a general rule of criminal justice. Congress determined that
the danger of repeated criminal acts is greatest in the case of defendants
awaiting trial.226 As a result of this policy judgment, Congress has devel-
oped a civil proceeding to provide preventive detention before trial.227
The Act is analogous to those commitment statutes designed to protect
society by confining certain offenders, such as sexual psychopaths and
defective delinquents, who have shown a course of habitual miscon-
duct.228 Moreover, the Court has previously acknowledged that Con-
gress has the authority to identify a class presenting a special danger if
the classification is reasonable and directly related to the legislative
goal.2 2
9
Despite the location of the Act in the title of the United States Code
dealing with crimes, the pretrial detention proceeding results in a com-
mitment that is essentially civil in nature, not criminal.23 The detention
hearing is an involuntary civil commitment proceeding. Although the
decision to detain is made in connection with a criminal prosecution, the
commitment to protect the community is civil, not criminal, in nature.
Congress could have chosen some other act or event to trigger the deten-
tion hearing; its decision to use a criminal charge as the triggering event
223. Id. at 263.
224. Id. at 264 (citations omitted).
225. Salerno I, 631 F. Supp. 1364, 1374 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). Although the detention decision did
not reflect a consideration of Salerno's needs, he was allowed to receive regular medication and use
an exercise bike as treatment for an alleged vascular condition. Id.
226. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEvs 3182, 3189. "ITihere is a small but identifiable group of particularly dangerous defendants as
to whom neither the impostion [sic] of stringent release conditions nor the prospect of revocation of
release can reasonably assure the safety of the community or other persons." Id.
227. Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f).
228. Note, Preventive Detention, supra note 39, at 1504. "Although most such statutes require
that the defendant be convicted of a crime before he may be committed, some states provide that
anyone charged with a criminal offense may be committed." Id
229. Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270, 274-75 (1940). "The legislature
is free to recognize degrees of harm, and... confine its restriction to those classes of cases where the
need is deemed to be clearest." Id. at 275.
230. United States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 218 (1986).
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does not alter the nature of the proceeding. 231 The commitment, which
lasts only until the criminal charge is resolved, through conviction or
acquittal, is not dependent upon the criminal justice system for its
authority.
The Court's mischaracterization of the cited precedents as an excep-
tion to the rule of criminal justice, prohibiting punishment before convic-
tion, does not undermine the validity of the precedents. The cases
provide clear examples of legitimate subordination of an individual's lib-
erty interest to a compelling governmental goal. When the preventive
detention provisions of the Act are correctly viewed as a form of civil
commitment, the Act clearly comports with the principles defined in the
precedents. As the Court concluded, the Act specifies circumstances
when society's interest in crime prevention is at its greatest and must
override an individual's strong interest in liberty.2 2
b. Length of detention
Perhaps the most significant impact of the Salerno decision will re-
sult from the Court's failure to address the permissible length of pretrial
detention. Federal courts have addressed this critical and controversial
issue and have agreed that detention may be invalid if unduly pro-
longed.23  They have not agreed, however, on the point at which con-
finement violates due process.23 4 This failure to establish parameters for
the period of detention will tend to increase the number of petitions from
detainees seeking release on the basis that the Act is unconstitutional as
applied.
The Court has acknowledged that the length of incarceration is inte-
gral to the due process analysis. 235 The decision that preventive deten-
tion of juveniles was consistent with the fifth amendment relied
significantly on the fact that the detention period was strictly limited.23 6
Moreover, a statute allowing commitment of incompetent criminal de-
fendants was invalidated because of the indefinite period of detention. 23 7
The Salerno opinion based its punitive/regulatory distinction in part on
the premise that the maximum length of pretrial detention is limited23 8
231. Id. at 117.
232. Salerno III, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2103 (1987).
233. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
234. Id
235. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
236. Schall, 467 U.S. at 269.
237. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 736.
238. Salerno III, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2101 (1987).
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and acknowledged that if detention is excessively prolonged it becomes
punitive.239 The Court, however, declined to discuss at what point the
character of detention changes.24
The failure to address the period of detention is consistent with the
view that the validity of detentions should be evaluated on a case-by-case
basis.241 While the statute may operate unconstitutionally by unduly
prolonging detention in some circumstances, this does not make the Act
unconstitutional on its face.242 Although appellate courts have identified
primary factors to assist in determining when due process demands re-
lease from detention, these factors focus on the facts peculiar to each
case.243 The subjective nature of these factors and the Court's position
on individualized determinations leave the door open for continued chal-
lenge to the Act.
2. Procedural Due Process
Predicting future conduct is inherently speculative and difficult.
Congress acknowledged that the predictions required under the Act
would not be infallible; however, Congress attempted to design proce-
dures that would narrow the exercise of discretion and result in an ac-
ceptable level of accuracy. 2" The Court, without detailed analysis,
found that Congress was successful.245
The Court's failure to articulate the basis of its approval is not fatal
because it has long accepted and relied on predictions of future criminal
conduct in many decisions and has required less than complete accuracy.
These predictions play a role in imposing a death sentence2 46 and in
239. Id. n.4.
240. Id. at 2101. The defendant in Salerno did not raise the length of confinement issue. Prior
to the argument before the Court, he had been convicted on charges in another case and sentenced to
100 years in prison. Therefore, even if the Act had been overturned, he would have remained in
confinement. Had the judgment in the other case been executed immediately, as is usually done, the
case presented to the Court would have been moot. Id. at 2106 and n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
241. Schall, 467 U.S. at 273.
242. Salerno III, 107 S. Ct. at 2100. The Court does not recognize "an 'overbreadth' doctrine
outside the limited context of the first amendment." Id. (citing Schall, 467 U.S. at 269 n.18).
243. United States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 1986). In addition to the factors
relevant to the initial detention decision, the court considered the length of detention that had oc-
curred, the complexity of the case, and whether the strategy of one side or the other had added
needlessly to the complexity. Id.
244. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 3182, 3192.
245. Salerno II, 107 S. Ct. at 2104.
246. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274-75 (1976).
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granting and revoking parole. 247 To base decisions on these predictions,
the Court requires only that procedures be adequate to ensure some
accuracy.248
The prediction of dangerousness issue has been strongly criticized 249
because the ability to predict who will engage in criminal activity in the
future is limited."' Even the psychological community has acknowl-
edged that its members are not competent to make predictions of future
violent behavior."' Furthermore, measuring the accuracy of predictions
made under the Act is impossible because there is no method of deter-
mining which detained defendants, if released, would commit crimes.
The ultimate procedural issue concerns the burden of proof that the
government must sustain to support its prediction. A standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt has historically been limited to criminal cases
because the decisions are punitive in purpose, and society has determined
that the risk of error to the individual must be minimized.2 52 A subjec-
tive judgment, such as that used in predicting dangerousness, however,
does not demand the same level of certitude attained in criminal cases.
Moreover, the Court has consistently held that significant restraints may
be imposed upon a finding based on a lesser standard of proof.253 On this
basis, the Salerno Court continued to maintain that the prediction of fu-
ture criminal conduct is not inherently unattainable.254
247. Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 9-10
(1979) (grant of parole); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972) (parole revocation).
248. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984). Procedures leading to the detention of juveniles
predicted to be dangerous need only be adequate to authorize at least some of those charged with
crimes. I&
249. The decisions of the courts hearing Salerno's case provide excellent examples of the predic-
tive abilities of judicial offices. At the detention hearing of Vincent Cafaro, one of Salerno's original
codefendants, the court concluded that "in view of the substantial evidence proffered, this court
cannot envision any set of conditions that could ensure the safety of the community from Cafaro."
Salerno I, 631 F. Supp. 1364, 1375 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The court apparently had not envisioned that
Cafaro would become a cooperating witness. Six months after its original finding, the court released
Cafaro. Salerno III, 107 S. Ct. at 2106.
250. Note, Pretrial Incarceration, supra note 39, at 1073 n.90.
251. Id. (quoting Task Force, American Psychological Ass'n, Report on the Role of Psychology
in the Criminal Justice System, 1978 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST, 1099, 1110).
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VI. CONCLUSION
United States v. Salerno brings an end to the argument that the Bail
Reform Act of 1984 is unconstitutional on its face. In Salerno, the Court
held that neither the due process clause of the fifth amendment nor the
excessive bail clause of the eighth amendment prohibits the preventive
detention scheme presented in the Act. The courts, however, will con-
tinue to receive challenges that the Act as applied results in prolonged
detention and thus violates the requirements of due process.
Rebecca M. Fowler
31
Fowler: United States v. Salerno: Detaining Dangerous Defendants
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1987
32
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 23 [1987], Iss. 3, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol23/iss3/3
